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Abstract
Malicious scripts are an important computer infection threat vector. Our analysis reveals
that the two most prevalent types of malicious scripts include JavaScript and VBScript.
The percentage of detected JavaScript attacks are on the rise. To address these threats,
we investigate two deep recurrent models, LaMP (LSTM and Max Pooling) and CPoLS
(Convoluted Partitioning of Long Sequences), which process JavaScript and VBScript as
byte sequences. Lower layers capture the sequential nature of these byte sequences while
higher layers classify the resulting embedding as malicious or benign. Unlike previously
proposed solutions, our models are trained in an end-to-end fashion allowing discriminative
training even for the sequential processing layers. Evaluating these models on a large corpus
of 296,274 JavaScript files indicates that the best performing LaMP model has a 65.9% true
positive rate (TPR) at a false positive rate (FPR) of 1.0%. Similarly, the best CPoLS model
has a TPR of 45.3% at an FPR of 1.0%. LaMP and CPoLS yield a TPR of 69.3% and
67.9%, respectively, at an FPR of 1.0% on a collection of 240,504 VBScript files.
1. Introduction
Malicious scripts are widely abused by malware authors to infect users’ computers. In
this paper, we show that in the current threat landscape, the two most prevalent types
of script malware that Windows users encounter are JavaScript (JS) and VBScript (VBS).
JavaScript is an interpreted scripting language developed by Netscape that is often included
in webpages to provide additional dynamic functionality Mozilla. VBScript, or Microsoft
Visual Basic Scripting Edition, is an active scripting language originally designed for Inter-
net Explorer and the Microsoft Internet Information Service web server Microsoft.
Spearphishing attacks have been a key component of several recent large-scale data
breaches (CRN; Snell). For example in Figure 1, a typical spearphishing attack involves
a user being sent an email stating that they have an outstanding invoice. An archive is
attached to the email, and inside the archive is a VBScript file called ”invoice.vbs”. If the
user opens the VBScript file, it will be executed through the default file association using
a native script execution host on Windows (in this example “wscript.exe”). Now that the
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malicious script is running on the computer, these attacks commonly download and execute
further malware such as ransomware (Corporation (2016)). Figure 2 presents examples of
malicious JavaScript and VBScript content.
Figure 1: Example of an email-based social engineering attack using an attached VBScript
file.
(a) Malicious JavaScript (b) Malicious VBScript
Figure 2: Example a) JavaScript file from the TrojanDownloader:JS/Swabfex malware fam-
ily, and b) from a malicious VBScript file from the Worm:VBS/Jenxcus malware family.
While a wide range of different machine learning models have been proposed for de-
tecting malicious executable files (Gandotra et al. (2014)), there has been little work in
investigating malicious JavaScript, and even less research has been devoted to trying to
detect malicious VBScript. Previous JavaScript solutions include those based on static
analysis (Likarish et al. (2009); Maiorca et al. (2015); Shah (2016)), and both static and
dynamic analysis (Corona et al. (2014)). Two previous solutions for VBScript are based
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on static analysis (Kim et al. (2006); Wael et al. (2017)). In addition, deep recurrent mod-
els have recently been proposed detecting system API calls in PE files (Athiwaratkun and
Stokes (2017); Kolosnjaji et al. (2016); Pascanu et al. (2015)), JavaScript (Wang et al.
(2016)), and Powershell (Hendler et al. (2018)).
There are several challenges posed by trying to detect malicious JavaScript and VB-
Script. One main challenge is the lack of labeled data. While obtaining malicious samples
is challenging enough, creating a large benign set of script files is extremely difficult given
strict privacy email policies which prevent manual inspection of undetected email. Fur-
thermore, malicious scripts include obfuscation to hide the malicious content, and often
unpack or decrypt the underlying malicious script only upon execution. Complicating this
is the fact that the obfuscators, in some cases, are used by both benign and malware files.
Thus pure static analysis of the primary script often fails to detect some malicious activity.
Another problem is that anti-virus (AV) automation systems such as sandboxing environ-
ments are designed primarily to handle Windows Portable Executable (PE) files (e.g., .exe
and .dll). Accordingly, the number of labeled script files is typically much lower than for
executable files.
In this paper, we propose ScriptNet, a deep recurrent neural classification system which
can be trained to detect either malicious JavaScript or VBScript using a combination of
both static and dynamic analysis. We first use a production anti-virus engine to dynamically
execute a script in a sandboxed environment inside of the engine. This allows the AV
engine to safely analyze any child scripts which are dropped during script execution without
infecting the computer.
We investigate two different models for the task of detecting malicious JavaScript and
VBScript. Both models encode sequential information using one or more long, short-term
memory (LSTM) layers. The LSTM and Max Pooling (LaMP) model follows a two-stage
approach where the first stage learns a language model for the individual characters in the
script content. Next, the second stage includes a, potentially deep, neural network for the
final classification of the script as malicious or benign. To allow the processing of longer
script files, we next investigate the Convoluted Partitioning of Long Sequences (CPoLS)
model which adds an additional layer consisting of a one-dimensional convolutional neural
network. LaMP is similar to the model proposed by Athiwaratkun and Stokes (2017) for
PE files, but differs in two respects. While Athiwaratkun’s model also has an LSTM-based
language model followed by a neural network classification stage, each component is trained
in isolation. The language model is first trained in an unsupervised fashion, and this trained
language model is then frozen and used to generate the embeddings for the classification
stage. Instead, LaMP is trained with end-to-end learning where all the model parameters,
including those in the language model and the classifier, are learned simultaneously directly
from the characters in the script content. Similarly, CPoLS is also trained in an end-to-
end manner. Second, LaMP extends the model in Athiwaratkun and Stokes (2017) to
allow for stacked (i.e., multiple) LSTM layers. Since our models operate directly on the
script content encoded as bytes, they do not require careful and potentially computationally
expensive feature engineering proposed by other solutions. The main contributions of this
paper include:
• We study the detection percentage and threat vectors of malicious JavaScript and
VBScript from telemetry generated by a production anti-virus product.
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Figure 3: Percentage of malicious files
detected by the Windows Defender anti-
malware engine over time in the categories
of JavaScript and VBScript attacks.
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Figure 4: Percentage of total detections by
file type in 2017. The remaining 92.5% of
detections were for PE files.
• We investigate two deep recurrent neural network models for the detection of malicious
JavaScript and VBScript.
• We evaluate these models on two large corpora of JavaScript and VBScript files.
2. Motivation
The detection of malicious JavaScript and VBScript is important for protecting users against
modern malware attacks. With advances in browser and operating system security making
browser exploit attacks more difficult, miscreants are instead relying on social engineering
attacks. Figure 3 illustrates the percentage of malicious detected files by the Windows
Defender anti-malware engine in the categories of JavaScript and VBScript attacks. The
percentage of malicious JavaScript-based attacks has been rising recently, while the percent-
age of detected attacks involving VBScript have remained relatively constant since 2014.
Figure 4 indicates the percentage of all, non-PE files detected in the Windows Defender
telemetry. This figure indicates that JavaScript and VBScript are the two most prevalent
types of detected scripts found in the telemetry data. Since the remaining 92.5% of the
detections are for PE files, malicious scripts are still a small minority of the detected files
in the wild.
Based on the identified arrival methods of malicious JavaScript and VBScript, Figure 5
illustrates the identified attack methods based on the telemetry data from 2017. Archive
file detections, the most prevalent threat vector for JavaScript, are generated when the
user extracts the script from within an archive and are often used in social-engineering
attacks. Interestingly, removable drives (e.g., thumbdrives, external USB harddrives) were
responsible for the second most JavaScript attacks. Only 11.1% of detected malicious
JavaScript files were encountered from malicious email, and 3.8% of the files were directly
downloaded from the internet.
The distribution of the attack sources for malicious VBScript tells a different story. The
main threat vector of malicious VBScript is emails followed closely again by downloads.
Archives and removable drives play a smaller role in VBScript attacks, but they are still
important threat vectors.
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Figure 5: Arrival methods for malicious JavaScript and VBScript files detected by the
Windows Defender anti-malware engine in 2017.
3. Threat Model
It is necessary to specify the assumptions that we make about the attacker. The most
important assumption is that the model is able to learn some deep embedding which is able
to identify activity related to malware from the first T bytes (e.g., 200, 1000) of the script.
If the first T bytes are randomly initialized, the models will fail to detect the activity that
somehow captures malicious intent.
Another assumption is that the behavior which identifies an unknown malicious script is
also found in labeled scripts in the training set. If the training set does not contain scripts
which are somehow related to the unknown script being evaluated, the classifier may again
fail to accurately predict the script type.
As part of the scanning process, the anti-malware engine emulates an unknown file and
attempts to extract any child scripts. It may be possible that the anti-malware engine fails
to successfully extract all the child scripts. In this case, the model may also fail to detect
the malicious script if the parent script is predicted to be benign, and the child script which
executes the malicious activity is not successfully extracted.
4. Data
Scripts: Building a dataset of malicious and benign scripts for training is a challenge. A
sizable percentage of malicious scripts are delivered in email and for privacy reasons cannot
be collected. For this research, samples were selected randomly from the files observed on
users’ computers during June 2017 that had been successfully collected, with permission,
by the Windows Defender backend. These samples are collected by many sources including
users directly submitting suspicious files for analysis, files shared through sample exchanges
such as VirusTotal, and scripts that were extracted from installer packages or archives.
Labels: Another challenge in training a classifier for detecting malicious scripts is obtaining
enough labeled data. Since we are trying to predict if a script is malware or benign, we
must obtain both types of labels.
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A script is labeled as malware if it has been inspected by our AV partner’s analysts and
determined to be malicious. In addition, the script is labeled as malicious if it has been
detected by the company’s detection signatures. Finally, scripts are labeled as malware if
eight or more other anti-virus vendors detect the script as malware.
Obtaining enough benign scripts is a challenge because labeling a script as benign often
requires manual inspection. Thus, a script is labeled as benign by a number of methods.
First, the script is considered benign if it has been labeled as benign by an analyst or has
been collected by a trusted source such as being downloaded from a legitimate webpage.
However, this does not provide enough labeled benign scripts so we augment this benign
dataset with scripts which are not detected by any trusted scanner at least 15 days after
our AV partner has first encountered it in the wild.
Datasets: Our anti-virus partners provided the first 1000 bytes of 296,274 JavaScript
files which contained 166,179 malicious and 130,095 benign scripts. We randomly assigned
these scripts into training, validation, and test sets containing 207,392, 29,627, and 59,255
samples, respectively. The validation set is a small dataset which is used for hyperparameter
tuning during the training phase. By doing so, we are later able to make a fair assessment
of the final model’s performance on the held-out test set. Similarly, our partners provided
a VBScript dataset with 240,504 examples including 66,028 malicious scripts and 174,476
benign scripts. This dataset was then randomly split into 168,353 training scripts, 24,050
validation scripts, and 48,101 test scripts.
5. System
Figure 6 presents an overview of the proposed neural script classification system. The
labeled collection of malicious and benign scripts (e.g., JavaScript or VBScript files), de-
scribed in the previous section, are first scanned with the Windows Defender anti-malware
engine. During this scanning operation, the script is emulated and unpacked and may drop
one or more additional scripts. Each child script is also emulated and unpacked which may
generate even more scripts. This process continues until all scripts have been extracted and
scanned.
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Script
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Script
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Script
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Figure 6: Overview of the neural script classification system.
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These scripts are next normalized. All whitespace characters, except line breaks, are
first removed. Next the text is standardized to lowercase and converted to the US-ASCII
character set. Any characters which are not included in the US-ASCII character set, such
as non-English language characters, are replaced by the constant character ‘?’. Figure 7
illustrates an example script before and after normalization.
a) Malicious JS before normalization b) Malicious JS after normalization
Figure 7: Example malicious packed JavaScript file from the TrojanDown-
loader:JS/Crimace.A malware family before (left), and after normalization (right).
Before training the model, each normalized script is written to the file system. To
avoid storing malicious content on the hard drive, the characters are next encoded by
their numeric ASCII encoding (e.g., ’97’ for the character ’a’) delimited by commas. This
delimited, encoded sequence data is then used to train the neural script malware model.
To evaluate an unknown file, the system uses the trained model to produce a prediction
which indicates the probability that the unknown script is malicious.
6. Models
Static and dynamic analysis of script files, like VBScript and JavaScript, allows our system
to use information hidden in the script’s unpacked content to learn its malicious nature. In
this section, we discuss our models which can capture the script files and learn malicious
intent using neural classifier models and sequential learning.
Translation to Sequences: The raw scripts can be considered to be documents contain-
ing a limited vocabulary set. As such, the scripts are long ordered sequences of encoded
characters. For normalized script files, we define our vocabulary as the set of all possible
bytes (8-bits). This leads to a vocabulary of size 256. Each normalized script, therefore, is
a sequence of these bytes.
Sequential Learning: In language models over document-like datasets, sequential learn-
ing is a commonly used learning methodology (Jo´zefowicz et al. (2016); Sutskever et al.
(2014)). Neural network-based models for sequential learning use Recurrent Neural Net-
works (RNNs), and their variants, to capture the ordered nature of elements, while learning
generally over each individual item. In our models, we use a specific memory-based gated
variant of RNNs, known as the Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) model (Gers et al.
(2000); Hochreiter and Schmidhuber (1997)). LSTMs are used extensively for processing
long sequences of data. In speech and language models in particular, enhanced LSTMs de-
7
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fine the state-of-the-art (Cho et al. (2014); Graves et al. (2013a,b); Sutskever et al. (2014)).
However, their general neural nature, along with the ability to learn using backpropaga-
tion through time (Werbos (1990)), makes them useful in many domains. For our byte
sequences, we therefore use LSTMs as the primary element for the capturing sequential
attributes of the data. LSTMs can often be implemented with minor variations in their
structure. The implementation used in our models, at each timestep t, is described by the
following equations:
it = σ(Whi ∗ ht−1 + Wxi ∗ xt + bi)
ft = σ(Whf ∗ ht−1 + Wxf ∗ xt + bf )
ot = σ(Who ∗ ht−1 + Wxo ∗ xt + bo)
ct = ft  ct−1 + it  tanh(Whc ∗ ht−1 + Wxc ∗ xt + bc)
ht = ot  tanh(ct)
(1)
where the nonlinearity defined by σ corresponds to the logistic sigmoid function. The vari-
ables it, ft,ot, ct are the input gate, forget gate, output gate and cell activation, respectively.
Wh∗(·) are the weight matrices for each gate corresponding to the recurrent input from the
previous timestep, Wx∗(·) are the input weight matrices per gate, and b∗(·) are the biases
for each gate. The function  represents the pairwise product between two vectors.
The network takes input vector xt at each timestep t, and updates two properties of the
LSTM. It updates the cell memory ct using the gates as well as the cell memory ct−1 from
the previous timestep. It then updates the hidden activation ht for timestep t by using the
gates and cell memory. The input vector provided to the LSTM cell can be of any structure
depending on the data. In a categorical representation, it can be a one-hot encoded vector,
while in the case of embeddings, it can be in the form of a dense vector. For sparse featured
data, the input can simply be a sparse vector.
Model Architectures: In our experiments for sequential learning, we designed two neural
model architectures. The primary difference in these two architectures is their resilience
against very long length sequences. We will discuss these properties in detail below.
LSTM and Max Pooling: In the LSTM and Max Pooling (LaMP) architecture, illustrated in
Figure 8, we first use an embedding layer, Embedding, to process the input byte sequence
B. Since each element in B corresponds to a byte from the vocabulary, it is symbolic in
nature. We use the embedding layer to transform each byte into a dense vector (i.e., an
embedding) which captures relatedness among different bytes, thereby assisting the overall
model in learning. The sequence of embeddings E is then passed through multiple LSTM
layers stacked on top of each other. The LSTM generates representations for each element
in the input sequence as HL. In order for us to perform classification on the sequence
and identify its hidden malicious content, we transform the sequence HL into a vector
highlighting significant information, while reducing its dimensionality. For this purpose, we
use a temporal, max pooling layer, MaxPool1d, as proposed by Pascanu et al. (2015).
Given an input vector sequence S = [s0, s2, . . . sM−1] ∈ S of length M , where each vector
si ∈ Rk is a k-dimensional vector, MaxPool1d computes an output vector sMP ∈ Rk as
sMP (k) = max(s0(k), s1(k), · · · sM−1(k)).
We pass the sequence HL through MaxPool1d to obtain vector hL. Next, hL is passed
through one or more dense neural layers employing a rectified linear (Relu) nonlinear
8
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activation function. This helps learn an additional layer of weights before performing the
final prediction. The Relu activated vector is finally used by a sigmoid layer to generate
final probability pm indicating if the script is malicious or benign. We can formally define
LaMP on an input byte sequence B as:
E = Embedding(B)
HL = LSTM(E)
hL = MaxPool1d(HL)
hCL = Relu(WL ∗ hL)
pm = σ(WD ∗ hCL)
(2)
where WL is the weight matrix for the dense Relu hidden layer, and WD is the weight
matrix for the final sigmoid classification layer.
While LaMP provides a simple model to capture sequences directly, it is limited by the
length of the input sequences. As the length of input sequence B increases, the model be-
comes both difficult to train and more memory-intensive. In the case of detecting malicious
content, long sequences can often separate two or more bytes far from each other even when
their combined presence is a cause of the malicious intent. When learning directly on a
sequence, it is possible for the model to lose the context of an identified byte earlier in the
sequence when processing a new byte at a larger distance. To cope with such problems
in detection, we therefore, propose another architecture called Convoluted Partitioning of
Long Sequences (CPoLS).
Convoluted Partitioning of Long Sequences: Convoluted Partitioning of Long Sequences
(CPoLS) is a neural model architecture designed specifically to extract classification infor-
mation hidden deep within long sequences. In this model illustrated in Figure 9, we process
the input sequence in parts by splitting it first into smaller pieces of fixed length. By per-
forming this step, we generate a sequence of multiple partitions, each of which is a sequence
in itself of a smaller length.
We use Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) LeCun and Bengio (1995) in this model,
along with the other LaMP modules. CNNs are widely used in computer vision (Krizhevsky
et al. (2012); Russakovsky et al. (2015)), and they have also recently shown success in
sequential learning domains as well (Gehring et al. (2016, 2017)).
Given an input byte sequence B, the model first splits it into a partitioned list C
containing several small subsequences ci ∈ C where i is the index of each partition in C.
To translate the bytes in these sequences from symbols to dense vectors, we pass them
through an embedding layer, Embedding, and obtain sequence E, where each element
ei ∈ E corresponds to the sequence of embeddings for partition ci in C. Each of these
partitions ei, are now separately processed, while still maintaining their overall sequential
nature. We call this method RecurrentConvolutions. In this method, we pass each
partition ei through the one-dimensional CNN, Conv1D, which applies multiple filters on
the input sequence and generates tensor eχi representing the convoluted output of vector
sequence ei. χ refers to the sequence with Conv1D performed on it. The combined list
of these convolved partitions eχi is referred to as E
χ. In RecurrentConvolutions, we
then reduce the dimensionality of eχi by performing a temporal max pooling MaxPool1d.
MaxPool1d takes a tensor input eχi and extracts a vector e
′
i from it. Similarly, we apply
9
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Figure 8: LaMP model for detecting malicious JavaScript and VBScript files.
RecurrentConvolutions on each partition ei to obtain the updated vectors e
′
i. These
vectors e′i are finally combined in the same order to create an updated sequence E
′ of learned
partition representations. With the help of partitioning, the length of E′ is also limited to
a trainable length.
At this stage, the model uses sequence E′ as an input to the LaMP model and learns the
probability pm that the script is malicious. Therefore, we use a combination of an LSTM, a
second MaxPool1d layer, dense Relu activations, and a final sigmoid layer for generating
the prediction pm on the new input sequence E
′. Formally, we define the CPoLS model
as:
C = Partition(B)
E = [Embedding(ci) ∀ci ∈ C]
Eχ = [Conv1D(ei) ∀ei ∈ E]
E′ = [MaxPool1d(eχi ) ∀eχi ∈ Eχ]
pm = LaMP (E
′)
(3)
Such a model is resilient to extremely long sequence lengths and can also find malicious
objects hidden very late in the sequence.
10
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Figure 9: Convoluted Partitioning of Long Sequences (CPoLS) model for detecting malicious
JavaScript and VBScript files.
End-to-End Learning: To train the models described above, we perform an end-to-end
learning process. Since the data available to us is in the form of a sequence and an associated
binary label, we need to train the entire model, solely from this label. In end-to-end learning,
we pass each sequence B through all layers of our model to derive the probability pm. Using
this probability, with the true label L ∈ {0, 1}, we measure the cross-entropy loss L. This
loss is used to compute the gradients required for updating the weights in each layer of the
model. Therefore, we simultaneously learn all the parameters for the primary classification
objective.
7. Experimental Results
We next evaluate the performance of the proposed neural malware script classifier models
on JavaScript and VBScript files using the data described in Section 4. We first start
by describing the experimental setup used to generate the results. Instead of training a
single model to detect both JavaScript and VBScript, we train individual models for each
11
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Script Type Model Parameter Description Value
JavaScript LaMP BJS,LaMP Minibatch Size 200
JavaScript LaMP HJS,LaMP LSTM Hidden Layer Size 1500
JavaScript LaMP EJS,LaMP Embedding Layer Size 64
JavaScript CPoLS BJS,CPoLS Minibatch Size 50
JavaScript CPoLS HJS,CPoLS LSTM Hidden Layer Size 1500
JavaScript CPoLS EJS,CPoLS Embedding Layer Size 64
JavaScript CPoLS WJS,CPoLS CNN Window Size 10
JavaScript CPoLS SJS,CPoLS CNN Window Stride 5
JavaScript CPoLS FJS,CPoLS Number of CNN Filters 128
VBScript LaMP BV BS,LaMP Minibatch Size 100
VBScript LaMP HV BS,LaMP LSTM Hidden Layer Size 1500
VBScript LaMP EV BS,LaMP Embedding Layer Size 128
VBScript CPoLS BV BS,CPoLS Minibatch Size 100
VBScript CPoLS HV BS,CPoLS LSTM Hidden Layer Size 1500
VBScript CPoLS EV BS,CPoLS Embedding Layer Size 128
VBScript CPoLS WV BS,CPoLS CNN Window Size 10
VBScript CPoLS SV BS,CPoLS CNN Window Stride 5
VBScript CPoLS FV BS,CPoLS Number of CNN Filters 128
Table 1: Settings for the various model parameters.
script type since a specific model can better learn to identify the nuances of each particular
scripting language. Accordingly, we first evaluate the LaMP and CPoLS models trained on
JavaScript files and then repeat the evaluation for models trained on VBScript files.
Experimental Setup: All the experiments were performed using Keras (Chollet et al.
(2015)) with the TensorFlow (Abadi et al. (2015)) backend. The models were trained and
evaluated on a cluster of NVIDIA K40 graphical processing unit (GPU) cards. All models
were trained with a maximum of 15 epochs, but early stopping was employed if the model
fully converged before reaching the maximum number of epochs.
We did hyperparameter tuning of the various input parameters for both types of script
models, and the results are summarized in Table 1. To do so, we first set the other hyperpa-
rameters to fixed values and then vary the hyperparameter under consideration. For exam-
ple, to evaluate different minibatch sizes for the JavaScript LaMP classifier, we first set the
LSTM’s hidden layer size HJS,LaMP = 1500, the embedding dimension to EJS,LaMP = 128,
the number of LSTM layers LJS,LaMP = 1 and the number of hidden layers in the classifier
CJS,LaMP = 1. With these settings, we evaluate the classification error rate on the vali-
dation set for the JavaScript dataset. Table 1 indicates the final hyperparameter settings
used for the remainder of the experiments.
JavaScript: We evaluate the performance of the LaMP model on the JavaScript dataset
in Figure 10a for several different combinations of LSTM stacked layers, LJS,LaMP , and clas-
sifier hidden layers, CJS,LaMP . Similarly, the CPoLS model is evaluated with the JavaScript
files in Figure 10b. For LaMP, adding either another stacked LSTM layer or classifier hidden
layer improves the detection results. On the other hand, the simplest CPoLS model with
one LSTM layer and one neural network hidden layer performs best. For lower FPRs, LaMP
offers significant performance advantages over CPoLS. This result indicates that sequential
modeling of the individual characters in the JavaScript content captures the underlying
behavior compared to a sequential model on the output of the convolutional processing of
the subsequences in CPoLS.
12
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At a false positive rate (FPR) of 1%, the best performing JavaScript LaMP model has
a true positive rate of 67.2% with LJS,LaMP = 2, CJS,LaMP = 1. Similarly for CPoLS with
LJS,CPoLS = 1, CJS,CPoLS = 1, the best performing model yields a TPR of 45.3% at an
FPR of 1.0%
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Figure 10: ROC curves for different JavaScript models.
VBScript: Next we evaluate the LaMP and CPoLS models for VBScript in Figures 11a
and Figure 11b, respectively. Similar to the JavaScript CPoLS model results, the simplest
LaMP and CPoLS VBScript models with a single LSTM layer and classifier hidden layer
offer the best, or nearly the best, performance compared to the more complex models. At an
FPR of 1.0%, the TPR for the LaMP model is 69.3% with LV BS,LaMP = 1, CV BS,LaMP = 1.
Similarly, CPoLS yields a TPR of 67.1% with LV BS,CPoLS = 1, CV BS,CPoLS = 1 at this
FPR = 1.0%.
8. Discussion
In this section, we consider several limitations of the proposed ScriptNet neural malware
script classification system. These include limitations due to the size of the GPU memory
and adversarial learning-based attacks.
One limitation is the maximum sequence length, T = 200, employed by the LaMP
models. This parameter value was primarily chosen because it allows the LaMP models to
be trained in the 12 GB of SDRAM on the NVIDIA K40. If the length was increased much
beyond this value, we could not train all the models investigated in this study. It may be
possible that more advanced GPUs that are released in the future, and contain more GPU
memory, might allow better performance if the maximum sequence length can be extended.
Attacks based on adversarial learning are another important concern. Both architec-
tures used in this study include recurrent LSTM and possibly deep neural network (DNN)
components. While researcher have not directly attacked LSTM structures using adver-
sarial learning-based attacks, Papernot et al. (2016) have shown that standard RNN cells
13
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Figure 11: ROC curves for different VBScript models.
(i.e., SimpleRNN) are vulnerable by unrolling the recurrent loop. Like DNNs, this unrolled
structure can then be attacked using a number of methods for crafting adversarial sam-
ples Hu and Tan (2017); Papernot et al. (2015). One possible defense is to run the classifier
in a secure enclave such as Intel’s SGX (Ohrimenko et al. (2016)). Other defenses including
distillation and ensembles have been explored for PE files (Grosse et al. (2017); Stokes et al.
(2017)).
9. Related Work
JavaScript: Maiorca et al. (2015) propose a static analysis-based system to detect mali-
cious PDF files which use features constructed from both the content of the PDF, including
JavaScript, as well as its structure. Once these features are extracted, the authors use a
boosted decision tree trained with the AdaBoost algorithm to detect malicious PDFs. Cova
et al. (2010) use the approach of anomaly detection for detecting malicious JavaScript code.
They learn a model for representing normal (benign) JavaScript code, and then use it during
the detection of anomalous code. They also present the learning of specific features that
helps characterize intrinsic events of a drive-by download. Hallaraker and Vigna (2005)
present an auditing system in Mozilla for JavaScript interpreters. They provide logging and
monitoring on downloaded JavaScript, which can be integrated with intrusion detection
systems for malicious behavior detection. In Likarish et al. (2009), they classify obfuscated
malicious JavaScript using several different types of classifiers including Naive Bayes, an
Alternating Decision Tree (ADTree), a Support Vector Machine (SVM) with using the Ra-
dial Basis Function (RBF) kernel, and the rule-based Ripper algorithm. In their static
analysis-based study, the SVM performed best based on tokenized unigrams and bigrams
chosen by feature selection. A PDF classifier proposed by Laskov and Sˇrndic´ (2011) uses a
one-class SVM to detect malicious PDFs which contain JavaScript code. Laskov’s system is
based solely on static analysis. The features are derived from lexical analysis of JavaScript
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code extracted from the PDF files in their dataset. Corona et al. (2014), propose Lux0R,
a system to select API references for the detection of malicious JavaScript in PDF docu-
ments. These references include JavaScript APIs as well as functions, methods, keywords,
and constants. The authors propose a discriminant analysis feature selection method. The
features are then classified with an SVM, a Decision Tree and a Random Forest model.
Like ScriptNet, Lux0R performs both static and dynamic analysis. However, they do not
use deep learning and require the extraction of the JavaScript API references. Wang et al.
(2016) use deep learning models in combination with sparse random projections, and logistic
regression. They also present feature extraction from JavaScript code using auto-encoders.
While they use deep learning models, the feature extraction and model architectures limit
the information extractability from JavaScript code. Shah (2016) propose using a statis-
tical n-gram language model to detect malicious JavaScript. Our proposed system uses an
LSTM neural model for the language model instead of the n-gram model proposed by Shah
(2016). Other papers which investigate the detection of malicious JavaScript include Liu
et al. (2014); Schu¨tt et al. (2012); Wang et al. (2013); Xu et al. (2012, 2013).
VBScript: While more research has been devoted to detecting malicious JavaScript,
partly because of its inclusion in malicious PDFs, only a few previous studies have considered
malicious VBScript. In Kim et al. (2006), a conceptual graph is first computed for VBScript
files, and new malware is detected by identifying graphs which are similar to those of known
malicious VBScript files. The method is based on static analysis of the VBScripts. Wael
et al. (2017) propose a number of different classifiers to detect malicious VBScript including
Logistic Regression, a Support Vector Machine with an RBF kernel, a Random Forest, a
Multilayer Perceptron, and a Decision Table. The features are created based on static
analysis. The best performing classifier in their study is the SVM. In Zhao and Chen
(2010), they detect malicious applets, JavaScript and VBScript based on a method which
models immunoglobulin secretion.
Other File Types: A number of deep learning models have been proposed for detecting
malicious PE files including Athiwaratkun and Stokes (2017); Dahl et al. (2013); Huang and
Stokes (2016); Kolosnjaji et al. (2016); Pascanu et al. (2015). In particular, a character-level
CNN has been proposed for detecting malicious PE files (Athiwaratkun and Stokes (2017))
and Powershell script files (Hendler et al. (2018)). Raff et al. (2017) discuss a model which
is similar to CPoLS but noted it did not work for PE files. They did not provide any results
for their model.
10. Conclusions
Malicious script classification is an important problem facing anti-virus companies. Failure
to detect a malicious script may result in a successful spearphishing, ransomware, or drive-
by download attack. Neural language models have shown promising results in the detection
of malicious executable files. Similarly, we show that these types of models can also detect
malicious JavaScript and VBScript files with relatively high true positive rates at low false
positive rates. These results are even more remarkable because the best performing models
only utilize the first 200 characters in the script, making them fast for large-scale production.
The performance results confirm that the LaMP and CPoLS architectures using LSTM
and CNN neural models are able to learn and generate representations of byte sequences in
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the scripts. In particular, the LaMP JavaScript malware script classification model using
two LSTM layers and one dense neural network layer offers the best results, while for
VBScript malware, the LaMP model with one LSTM and one hidden layer is significantly
better than the competing models. The embeddings generated in these models, therefore,
capture important sequential information from within the script file and help to predict
their malicious nature through neural training over these embeddings.
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